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Formalism, Realism, and Patent Scope
INTRODUCTION
A popular theme these days when discussing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
is that it is “formalist.”1 According to this developing meme, the Federal Circuit prefers 
rigid, sweeping, legalistic rules that fail to adequately consider complex policy judgments; 
DQGLWLVWKHQUHYHUVHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWIRUWKLVLQÁH[LELOLW\2 Various theories are put 
forward to explain the Federal Circuit’s penchant for formalistic analysis.  Peter Lee argues 
that it is because generalist judges, especially district court judges, are psychologically 
averse to complex technology, and therefore use formalist rules to avoid grappling with 
complex issues.3 Attributing the same result from a diametrically opposite cause is Jeffrey 
Lefstin, who argues that the Federal Circuit’s formalistic jurisprudence is the legacy of its 
predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, a specialized court that reviewed 
GHFLVLRQVIURPWKH3DWHQWDQG7UDGHPDUN2IÀFH4 Instead of an aversion to complex 
technology—rather implausible in the context of the CCPA—Lefstin argues that the court 
adopted a formalistic view of patent law in order to assert control over the more technically 
sophisticated tribunal beneath it.5 Although these commentators disagree radically on the 
causes of formalism, they agree that the Federal Circuit is formalistic.
My goal in this Essay is to challenge this emerging wisdom, or at least qualify its contours, 
in the area of patent scope, an area on which many critics of Federal Circuit formalism focus 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.  Thanks to Peter Lee and Richard Pos-
ner for comments.  The views expressed are my own.
1.  John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 792 (2003).
2.  See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1125-26 (2003) (“[M]ore rigorous Supreme Court review[] should dislodge the Federal 
Circuit from its rigid adherence to formalism.”); see also Timothy Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based 
Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123 (2005) (arguing that the Federal Circuit pre-
fers “substantive” formalism while the Supreme Court prefers “process-based” formalism).
3.  Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 29-32 (2010) (“[H]ypertextualism partially 
LQVXODWHVERWKWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWMXGJHDQGDSSHOODWHMXGJHVIURPFHUWDLQGLIÀFXOWWHFKQRORJLFDOO\LQWHQVLYHLQ-
quiries.”).
4.  Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape 
of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843 (2010).
5.  Id. at 858.
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6.  See Holbrook, supra note 2; Lee, supra note 3, at 29; Lefstin, supra note 4, at 879; Thomas, supra note 
1, at 792 (“Some of the most prominent principles of the patent law, governing the subject matter that can be 
patented, rights acquisition, and the scope of protection, have become more rulebound.”).
7.  See, e.g., Nelson Lund & Craig Lerner, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV.GHVFULELQJWKH6RWRPD\RUFRQÀUPDWLRQKHDULQJWHVWLPRQ\
8.  See, e.g., K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66-69 (1951) (“People—and 
they are curiously many—who think that precedent produces or ever did produce a certainty that did not in-
volve matters of judgment . . . do not know our system of precedent.”).
9.  See, e.g., Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
1, 33 (2007).
10.  Robert P. Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Claim Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
839 (1990).
11.  Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2009) (arguing that because claim interpretation is so unpredictable, peripheral claims 
should be abolished).
12.  Cf. Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1671 (2003) (“The 
Federal Circuit has proven particularly resistant to considering patent policy in making its decisions.”).
their analysis.6 The Federal Circuit is not a formalistic court in practice.  To be sure, the 
Federal Circuit often uses formalist-sounding rhetoric, but such is true of many other 
courts and judges.7 The contribution of Legal Realism was that despite such rhetoric, 
judges in fact were not jurisprudential machines, and legal decisions were not purely 
the result of logical deduction from precedent and doctrine.8 Such is no less true of the 
Federal Circuit.  To speak of the Federal Circuit as a formalistic court is thus to elevate 
the court’s rhetoric over its actual jurisprudence.
2QFHZHORRNEH\RQGWKHUKHWRULFWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW·VMXULVSUXGHQFHLVMXVWDVÁH[LEOH
and indeterminate as any other area of law.  This is particularly true of patent scope, 
the main focus of this Essay.  The Federal Circuit’s wide discretion over patent scope 
through claim interpretation and determination of claim validity through enablement is 
widely known.9 This has been known at least since Merges and Nelson argued that patent 
EUHDGWKUDWKHUWKDQWKHVWDWXWRULO\À[HGSDWHQWWHUPZDVWKHVXSHULRULQVWUXPHQWRI
effectuating the utilitarian policy of the patent system.10
There is some tension, then, between two oft-heard claims regarding the Federal 
&LUFXLW·VSDWHQWVFRSHMXULVSUXGHQFH7KHÀUVWFODLPLVWKDWWKLVMXULVSUXGHQFH
is formalistic.  The second is that this jurisprudence is wildly unpredictable and 
indeterminate.11 If formalism means adherence to rigid and deterministic rules, then these 
two propositions almost necessarily contradict each other on the level of actual results.  
The ironic consequence of subscribing to formal rhetoric while exercising pragmatic 
judgment sub rosa is that the Federal Circuit is criticized for both.12 Again, however, this 
phenomenon is ubiquitous across the law—almost every court pretends that it has less 
discretion than in actuality; and exposing this fact was a key point of the Legal Realism 
movement.
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13.  Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism8&KL/5HYGHÀQLQJWKLVDVµFODVVLFDO
formalism”); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 955 (1988) (“[F]ormalism postulates that 
juridical content can somehow sustain itself from within.”).
14.  Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 281-85 
(1997).
15.  Id. at 278 (“What the descriptive Formalist really claims is that judges are (primarily) responsive to legal 
reasons, while the Realist claims that judges are (primarily) responsive to nonlegal reasons.”).
16.  Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 523 (1988) (arguing that “[m]echanical deducibility need 
not entail closure” and “nonmechanical judgments can be made within the boundaries of a single system”).
17.  JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 147 (1949) (“[T]he idea of a ‘mechanical jurisprudence’ was an absur-
dity.”).
18.  RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 240-50, 254-58 (1986).  In many ways, Dworkin’s approach requires an 
extremely expansive conception of what constitutes “law,” as it also includes various moral considerations.  Id. 
at 255-56; Emily Sherwin, Rules-Oriented Realism, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1578 n.2 (2005).
19.  Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1060 (1975); RONALD DWORKIN, Pragmatism and 
Law, in JUSTICE IN ROBES 36, 42 (2006) (arguing that lawyers making legal arguments show that they believe 
there is a right answer to the case, “as a matter of ordinary legal judgment”).
I.  FORMALISM DEFINED
Stated generally, formalism is the philosophy that law is a self-contained discipline, and that 
there is always one “correct” answer to legal problems that can be reached using the internal 
tools of the discipline,13 primarily logic, precedent, and rules.  This is used in contradistinction 
to realism, which argues that, at least in some cases, the tools of formal legal analysis will 
not produce a single correct answer, and that legal decision-makers will in such cases refer 
to extra-legal policy considerations.  Realism (at least its moderate strains) does not imply 
there is no right answer at all to cases, but holds instead that the right answers often cannot 
be arrived at using law alone and requires consideration of broader non-legal sources such as 
economic policy or industry custom.14 The dispute is less one about whether case outcomes are 
determinate or correct and more about the triggers that determine such outcomes.15
)URPWKLVJHQHUDOGHÀQLWLRQRIIRUPDOLVPLWLVXVHIXOWRIXUWKHUVXEGLYLGHWKHVFKRROV
of formalist thought.  The extreme version of formalism may be described as “mechanical 
jurisprudence,” which is the belief that not only is there a right answer to legal questions 
that can be derived using the internal sources of the legal discipline, but that this correct 
answer can be rather straightforwardly deduced through a mechanical process.16 Although 
practically no modern legal academic believes that mechanical jurisprudence is an even 
remotely accurate way to describe the operation of our legal system,17 it holds powerful sway 
over popular discussion of law and the judicial role.
A less ambitious theory of formalism is associated primarily with Ronald Dworkin.  
Dworkin acknowledges that legal reasoning is not a mechanical exercise, and that legal 
answers require exercising judgment.18 The only thing that makes a scholar like Dworkin 
a formalist is his thesis that there is a “right” answer to every legal question based on legal 
tools,19 even though reasonable judges can and often will disagree on what that right answer 
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20.  DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 240-50, 254-58.
21.  See George C. Christie, Dworkin’s Empire, 1987 DUKE L.J. 157, 184-85 (1987).
22.  Leiter, supra note 14, at 278.
23.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers 
Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998); see also Lee, supraQRWHDWGHÀQLQJIRUPDOLVPDV
“decisionmaking according to rule”).
24.  Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1688 
(1976).
25.  FRANK, supra note 17, at 147.
26.  Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 613 (2007).
27.  Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 215, 219 (2010) 
(“[N]early everything in a patent case turns on claim construction.”).
28.  In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
is.20 The concession that many people will disagree on what the right answer is makes 
WKHULJKWDQVZHUWKHVLVIXQGDPHQWDOO\XQWHVWDEOHDQGXQIDOVLÀDEOH21 Absent the stronger 
premise of mechanical jurisprudence that the correct legal answer can be discerned in 
some predictable manner using a limited tool set, the divide between formalists and realists 
is more theoretical than practical, since realists too acknowledge judges seek to reach a 
correct result—they just think that judges refer to extra-legal tools.22
Formalism, especially in its mechanical jurisprudence guise, is associated with rules.23 
Rules are supposed to cabin judicial discretion and provide determinate answers.24 The 
association is only a loose one, since almost everyone acknowledges that the legal system 
does not rely solely on mechanical rules.25 Conversely, Legal Realists do not deny that courts 
often do proclaim rigid rules that dictate particular outcomes in particular situations.  Instead, 
realism views legal doctrine as hopelessly indeterminate not (or, at least, not 
primarily) because of the indeterminacy of discrete doctrinal sources but 
mainly because of their multiplicity. The indeterminacy of legal doctrine 
GHULYHVÀUVWDQGIRUHPRVWIURPWKHDYDLODEOHOHHZD\LQFKRRVLQJWKH
applicable rule rather than from the ambiguity of that rule once chosen.26
The question is not whether there are rules, but whether the rules combine to produce a 
determinate answer.
II.  HIDDEN REALISM IN PATENT SCOPE
The indeterminacy of legal doctrine in the area of patent scope is so well known as 
to require little elaboration here.  As background, patent scope is governed primarily by 
WZRLQVWUXPHQWV$WDÀUVWOHYHOFRXUWVUHJXODWHWKHSUDFWLFDOSDWHQWVFRSHE\LQWHUSUHWLQJ
claims broadly or narrowly.27 In addition, courts can regulate patent breadth by invalidating 
a claim for being unduly broad, which in modern doctrine is done under the rubric of 
section 112 of the patent statute.28 Both of these doctrinal tools—claim construction 
and section 112 enablement doctrine—are discretionary policy instruments rather than 
92 IP THEORY   Volume 1:  Issue 2
29.  Dogan, supra note 26, at 613.
30.  Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Meaning in 
Claim Construction, 42 IDEA 1, 2 (2002) (describing uncertainty); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years 
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233, 239 (2005) (reporting a 
34.5% reversal rate for claim construction).
31.  Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217 (1940).
32.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
33.  See Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]here is some-
WLPHVDÀQHOLQHEHWZHHQUHDGLQJDFODLPLQOLJKWRIWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQDQGUHDGLQJDOLPLWDWLRQLQWRWKHFODLP
IURPWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQµ5REHUW8QLNHO	'RXJODV(YHOHLJKProtecting Inventors, Not Fortune Tellers: The 
Available Patent Protection for After-Developed Technologies, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 88 n.9 (2006) (“How one 
FDQUHDGFODLPV¶LQOLJKWRIWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQ·EXW\HWDYRLGLPSRUWLQJOLPLWDWLRQVIURPWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQKDV
never been adequately explained, perhaps because these ostensibly contradictory tenets of claim construction 
cannot be reconciled.”).
2·5HLOO\Y0RUVH86´7KHVSHFLÀFDWLRQRIWKLVSDWHQWHHGHVFULEHVKLVLQYHQWLRQRU
discovery and the manner and process of constructing and using it; and his patent . . . covers nothing more.”).
35.  Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
36.  Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
formalist rules.  This indeterminacy is not because courts have not pronounced bright-line 
rules, but instead because courts have proclaimed multiple bright-line rules that contradict 
each other.  The choice among the ostensibly bright-line rules thereby becomes the source 
of legal indeterminacy and judicial discretion.29
The contradiction of bright-line rules in the claim construction context is well known, 
as is the uncertainty caused by this doctrinal indeterminacy.307KHÀUVWUXOHRIFODLP
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVWKDWFODLPVPXVWEHLQWHUSUHWHG´LQWKHOLJKWRI>WKHLU@VSHFLÀFDWLRQVµ31 The 
second rule of claim interpretation is that a court must never “import[] limitations from the 
VSHFLÀFDWLRQLQWRWKHFODLPµ32 Since a claim is only a set of limitations listing what features an 
accused product must contain to infringe, the effect of interpreting a claim by reference to the 
VSHFLÀFDWLRQLVQHFHVVDULO\WRDGGOLPLWDWLRQVWKDWDFRXUWRWKHUZLVHZRXOGQRWUHDGLQWRWKH
claim.  In other words, if a court would reach exactly the same interpretation whether or not 
LWFRQVLGHUVWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQWKHQWKHÀUVWUXOHRIFODLPLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZRXOGEHPHDQLQJOHVV
But a court reaching a different interpretation becauseLWFRQVLGHUHGWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQWKHUHE\
LPSRUWVDOLPLWDWLRQIURPLW7KHWZRUXOHVWKXVÁDWO\FRQWUDGLFWHDFKRWKHU33
$VLPLODUVHWRIFRQWUDGLFWRU\UXOHVLQÁLFWVWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW·VMXULVSUXGHQFHRQVHFWLRQ
112.  At one level, the simple notion of quid pro quo suggests that patent scope may only 
cover the embodiments that the patentee contributes to the public through disclosure in 
WKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQ34 Thus one line of cases requires that the claim be limited to only what is 
WDXJKWRU´HQDEOHGµE\WKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQDWWKHWLPHRISDWHQWÀOLQJ35 On the other hand, such 
a formula would eviscerate patent incentives, since later-arising technology would predictably 
create improvements that function as close substitutes, but would not have been taught (nor 
FRXOGWKH\KDYHEHHQWDXJKWE\WKHSDWHQWHHDWÀOLQJ36 Thus, another line of cases holds that 
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37.  Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that a claim is not 
invalid even if it “reads on another embodiment of the invention which is inadequately disclosed”); see also 
Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 273 (1889) (“[A]ll subsequent machines which employ 
substantially the same means to accomplish the same result are infringements, although the subsequent ma-
chine may contain improvements . . . .”).
38.  Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1087 (2009).
39.  See generally Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434465; Jeffrey A. 
Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141 
(2009) (arguing that enablement doctrine cannot be formally realized).
40.  Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 547 (2010).
the patentee may claim undisclosed and untaught embodiments, apparently without any 
À[HGOLPLWV37 Once again, the two lines of cases directly contradict each other.38
1RWRQO\DUHWKHUHLUUHFRQFLODEOHFRQÁLFWVLQGRFWULQHWKHVHFRQÁLFWVDUHHVVHQWLDOWRWKH
proper functioning of the patent system, because each line of cases has severe defects that 
are responsible for the contrary line.39 Limiting the patentee to the embodiments taught by 
WKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQ³HLWKHUWKURXJKD´VRIWµGRFWULQHRIFUHDWLYHO\LQWHUSUHWLQJFODLPODQJXDJH
WRDOZD\VEHFRQÀQHGWRVSHFLÀFDWLRQHPERGLPHQWRUD´KDUGµGRFWULQHRILQYDOLGDWLQJDQ\
claims that go beyond this—might be a principled implementation of the patent quid pro 
quo, but it would result in the practical outcome of destroying all patent incentives.  On the 
other hand, permitting patentees to broadly cover later-arising improvements that were not 
WDXJKWE\WKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQZLOOUHVXOWLQH[FHVVLYHPRQRSRO\FRVWV2QO\E\VHOHFWLYHO\
oscillating between contradictory bright-line rules does the Federal Circuit maintain 
VXIÀFLHQWGLVFUHWLRQWRDFKLHYHVRPHEDODQFHLQSDWHQWVFRSH7RDGRSWHLWKHURIWKH
absolutist rules suggested by the case law would result in a radically skewed patent system.
7KHSRLQWLVWKHUHIRUHQRWWKDWWKHFRQÁLFWLQGRFWULQHLVDEDGWKLQJ,QIDFWGRFWULQDO
FRQÁLFWDQGKLGGHQUHDOLVPLVRQEDODQFHDJRRGWKLQJDWOHDVWLQFRPSDULVRQWRDQ




current system—a very realist system that relies heavily on hidden discretion in picking and 
FKRRVLQJDPRQJFRQWUDGLFWRU\FDVHVWKURXJKLPSOLFLWFRVWEHQHÀWEDODQFLQJ³LVVWLOOYDVWO\
preferable to the disastrous system that would result if courts actually practiced mechanical 
jurisprudence by following a single set of bright-line rules, in addition to merely preaching it.
III.  SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE REALIST ANALYSIS
A.  Does the Federal Circuit Really Rely on Policy Balancing?
Even accepting that judges possess discretion to choose among the rules, I cannot 
prove that judges are using extra-legal considerations such as economic balancing and 
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41.  DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 229-30.
42.  Lee, supra note 3, at 29.
-DQJY%RVWRQ6FLHQWLÀF&RUS)G)HG&LU´:LWKRXWNQRZOHGJHRIWKHDF-
cused products, this court cannot assess the accuracy of the infringement judgment under review and lacks a 
proper context for an accurate claim construction.” (quoting Lava Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 
445 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006))).
44.  Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he con-
struction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language . . . .”).
45.  SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (emphasis in 
original).
technological context to guide their decisions.  Perhaps, as Dworkin might argue, judges 
faced with hard legal questions are still looking to reconcile the apparently contradictory 
GRFWULQHDVEHVWDVWKH\FDQVRWKDWODWHUGHFLVLRQV´ÀWµZLWKHDUOLHUGHFLVLRQVOLNHDFKDLQ
novel.417KXVZKLOHGHPRQVWUDWLQJODWHQWGLVFUHWLRQLQSDWHQWVFRSHGRFWULQHLVVXIÀFLHQWWR
rebut the kind of mechanical formalism—“decisionmaking according to rule”—that Lee 
theorizes,42 it does not rebut more nuanced styles of formalism as descriptive theories of 
patent scope jurisprudence.  And because the subjective decision-making process of judges 
is inscrutable, no conclusive proof can be had on this issue.
In some ways, whether judges perceive their own discretion, and how they exercise it, 
DUHTXHVWLRQVWKDWQHHGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGLQDUHIXWDWLRQRIIRUPDOLVP,WVXIÀFHVWRVKRZ
that the discretion exists, so that formal doctrine is not determinate.  Again, at a minimum, 
VXFKDVKRZLQJLVVXIÀFLHQWWRGHIHDWWKHPHFKDQLFDOMXULVSUXGHQFHUXOHERXQGYDULHW\RI
formalism.
At the same time, one observation strongly suggests that judges are in fact making 
pragmatic decisions according to extra-formal policy considerations, whether consciously 
or subconsciously.  I am referring to the Federal Circuit’s rule mandating that evidence 
regarding the accused product be presented to it when appealing issues of textual claim 
interpretation,43 even though strictly speaking such evidence is completely irrelevant under 
any understanding of formal doctrine.
Under the formal theory of claim interpretation, the point of interpreting claims is simply 
to ascertain the meaning of the text.44 This is true whether that interpretation is aided by the 
VSHFLÀFDWLRQRUQRW7KHUHLVQRFRQFHLYDEOHUHDVRQWKDWWKHDFFXVHGSURGXFWLVUHOHYDQWWR
WKLVWH[WXDOH[HUFLVHDQGHDUO\)HGHUDO&LUFXLWFDVHVVWDWHGÁDWO\WKDWFODLPVDUHQRWWREH
interpreted in light of the accused device:
A claim is construed in the light of the claim language, the other claims, the 
SULRUDUWWKHSURVHFXWLRQKLVWRU\DQGWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQnot in light of the 
accused device. Contrary to what [the accused infringer] wrote the district 
court, claims are not construed “to cover” or “not to cover” the accused de-
vice. That procedure would make infringement a matter of judicial whim.45
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46.  442 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
47.  Jang, 532 F.3d at 1338.
48.  Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371, 1377 n.31 (2010).
49.  See Christopher Wolfe, The Senate’s Power to Give “Advice and Consent” in Judicial Appointments, 82 
MARQ. L. REV. 355, 366 (1999) (“The predominant lens through which legal history is viewed today is legal 
realism, which, in varying degrees according to its more or less extreme forms, holds that judges are basically 
‘politicians in robes.’”)
50.  See supra text accompanying notes 34–36.
In a string of cases beginning with Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby 
Co.,46 the Federal Circuit has twisted this evidentiary rule 180 degrees, so that the 
procedure is now exactly what the Federal Circuit had once condemned as opening the 
door to “judicial whim.”  Under its latest decision in this line, the appellate record must 
FRQWDLQVXIÀFLHQWLQIRUPDWLRQIRUWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWWRNQRZZK\WKHDFFXVHGSURGXFW
would infringe under one claim construction and would not under an alternative.47 If this 
is not construing a claim “‘to cover’ or ‘not to cover’ the accused device,” then nothing 
is.  The logical inference from this mandatory requirement of presenting what is, formally 
speaking, completely irrelevant evidence is that the judges regard such extra-formal 
considerations as highly relevant to their actual decision-making.  And although Wilson is 
a relatively new rule, the Federal Circuit’s longstanding (but unwritten) practice of never 
certifying interlocutory appeals on claim construction also achieved much of the same 
HIIHFWRIHQVXULQJWKDWWKHDSSHOODWHUHFRUGXVXDOO\FRQWDLQHGVXIÀFLHQW´FRQWH[WµWRDOORZ
pragmatic decision-making since an appeal could only happen after a summary judgment 
or trial record was assembled.48
To say that the Federal Circuit is a realistic court despite its formalist rhetoric does not 
imply or require the judges to be acting in a massive conspiracy of deception.  Certainly 
it does not suggest that all judges are politicians in robes, as caricatures of legal realism 
often suggest.49 All it requires is that the discretionary choices rely on intuition, and such 
intuition is frequently unperceived and unconscious.  For example, suppose that a scientist 
LQYHQWVDSLOOWKDWFXUHV$,'6ZULWHVDVSHFLÀFDWLRQWKDWIXOO\GHVFULEHVKRZWRPDNHWKH
cure and demonstrates it is 100% effective in curing AIDS, and then writes a claim for “a 
pill that cures AIDS.”  Suppose then a pirate makes a exact replica of the pill.  Almost any 
judge—indeed almost any person—would agree that there is only one “right” answer to 
the infringement case: the pirate is clearly infringing.
At the same time, this result is only “easy” when considered entirely using extra-formal 
considerations and not using formal legal reasoning.  Under the formal legal doctrine, 
plausible arguments can be made either way regarding whether the claim to “a pill that cures 
AIDS” is validly enabled.  The inventor has not taught every future pill that cures AIDS, he 
has described only one such pill, and under quid pro quo line of enablement cases the claim 
would be invalid.50 But there is no reasonable judge who would rule in this way, and no 
plausible lawyer who would even advise the pirate to bring the case to litigation.  For a judge 
to rule for the patentee requires no bad faith or disingenuousness, the judge is simply not 
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52.  Lee, supra note 3, at 25-26.
53.  Lee disclaims any claim of conscious intent on the part of Federal Circuit judges to create formalist rules 
in order to avoid interacting with technology.  Id. at 28-29.  But this makes the aversion-to-technology theory 
even more implausible.  It is unlikely that judges with an aversion to technology would subconsciously cre-
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perceiving that the formal doctrine is incoherent and there are two possible answers among 
ZKLFKKHPXVWDFWXDOO\FKRRVH,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHMXGJHFRPPLWVWKHHUURURIFRQÁDWLQJWKH
answer that he thinks doctrine should give with the answer he thinks the doctrine then does 
give.51 Such mixing of normative and descriptive implies neither that judges are stupid nor 
that they are deceptive, but only that they are human.
B.  Does Recognizing Hidden Realism Matter?
One criticism of the foregoing analysis might be that my disagreement with Lee, Lefstin, 
and others who argue the Federal Circuit is formalistic is overstated or even non-existent.  
The Federal Circuit certainly often uses formalist rhetoric.  Thus, Lee, Lefstin, and others 
describe what the Federal Circuit says, and I describe what the Federal Circuit does.  There 
is no necessary inconsistency in these descriptive claims.  At the same time, recognizing 
the Federal Circuit’s actual jurisprudence as realist carries implications regarding why that 
court’s rhetoric remains formalist—implications that are in tension with many conventional 
accounts.
To take one example, Lee argues in his article that the Federal Circuit is formalistic 
because it and lower court judges seek to avoid interacting with complex technology, 
and having hard mechanical rules triggered by such things as text avoids complex policy 
balancing.52 For this motivation to work—for judges actually to be able to avoid considering 
complex technology—the doctrine must remove discretion to consider technological 
context in actual practice, or at least delude lower courts into believing as much.53 If, 
notwithstanding the rhetoric, everyone knows that patent scope is actually discretionary, 
then everyone still has to consider technological context, but now additionally must dress 
everything up behind legalistic mumbo-jumbo.  Instead of allowing judges to be cognitive 
misers, formalism would actually add to their workload.  To recognize the Federal Circuit’s 
patent scope jurisprudence as heavily realist would thus cast doubt on Lee’s theory.
In a similar vein, Lefstin’s theory that the Federal Circuit’s formalism is a carryover from 
the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals’ project to exert control over the PTO would only 
work if the formal doctrine imposed practical limits on discretion, or at least convinced 
the lower agency that there were such limits.  If everyone knew that formal doctrine was 
empty rhetoric and the appellate court was in fact exercising policy-based discretion, 
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then the charade would collapse.  Of course, the appellate court still may assert control 
through de novo review, but it could have done that directly by making a naked power-
grab.  Presumably the point of using formalist rhetoric is to avoid the naked power-grab 
that would have provoked political resistance.  If so, cloaking a power-grab in formalist 
rhetoric is useful only to the extent that the cloaking rhetoric deceives somebody.  Again, if 
the point of formalism was to allow greater control over the PTO, it is not clear why empty 
formalism that is also known to be empty would help in the slightest.
The problem for both theories is that the Federal Circuit’s formalist rhetoric has not 
lived up to the promise of producing actual binding rules in the area of patent scope, so the 
rhetoric is empty.  Moreover, by now, everybody involved with the patent system has been 
clued-in on the secret, at least to some degree.  Complaints about the unpredictability and 
indeterminacy of patent scope doctrine are legion and exhaustively documented.54 If the 
goal of the Federal Circuit in proclaiming formalistic rules was to assert greater control 
over lower agencies or prevent judges from considering complex technological problems, 
then these are at most failed and futile exercises in wishful thinking.  The cost of this failed 
experiment has been to drive the discretion underground, so less information is available to 
make considered policy judgments, while the same policy judgments must still be made.
A broader look, however, suggests an explanation for the Federal Circuit’s formalistic 
rhetoric that makes its continuation entirely unsurprising even if insiders of the patent 
V\VWHPDUHJHQHUDOO\DZDUHRILWVHPSWLQHVVVLQFHWKLVMXVWLÀFDWLRQLVQRWSDWHQWVSHFLÀF
but is instead shared with every other court.  The broader look reveals that every court 
regularly uses formalistic rhetoric; and indeed the more policy discretion a court has, 
the more the court takes pains to deny that such discretion exists.55 The reason is that 
courts perceive the need to invoke formalism to preserve their legitimacy in the eyes of 
the general public.567KLVSHUFHSWLRQLVIXOO\MXVWLÀHGJLYHQWKDWWKHSXEOLFORYHVWKHLGHD
of mechanical jurisprudence and every judicial nominee swears a blood oath before the 
Senate to practice it.57 Unlike the insiders of the patent system who have all become clued-
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in to the Federal Circuit’s latent discretion, the general public may well remain convinced 
WKDWSDWHQWVFRSHUHÁHFWVDQDXWRPDWLFquid pro quo with judges mechanically enforcing 
patent awards.58
The comparison with the Supreme Court raises the question of why the Federal Circuit—
often seen as a non-political court that deals with a specialized and obscure area of 
law59—still uses formalistic rhetoric when the need for “protective coloration” might seem 
less pressing.  But this has the causation backwards.  Despite the perception, intellectual 
property issues are in fact quite policy driven and ideologically charged: when the cases go 
to the Supreme Court, the “conservative” justices predictably rule in favor of intellectual 
property owners, and the “liberal” justices predictably rule in favor of accused infringers.60 
It is precisely because the Federal Circuit uses so much formalistic rhetoric and protective 
coloration that it is still perceived as a non-political court dealing with a technocratic area, 
despite the reality that it is largely making ideological policy judgments like any other 
court.  All courts have always sought to cover their policy judgments from scrutiny by 
hiding those policy judgments behind the perception that judges are apolitical experts.61 
The Federal Circuit is simply more successful than other courts in this endeavor, because 
LWFDQFODLPWKDWWKHLVVXHVIDOOLQJZLWKLQLWVGRPDLQDUHUHVROYHGXVLQJDSROLWLFDOVFLHQWLÀF
expertise in addition to apolitical legal expertise (the latter becoming progressively less 
persuasive with the advance of legal realism).627KHWDFWLFRISURIHVVLRQDOP\VWLÀFDWLRQ
remains the same; the difference is only the degree of success.
Whether preaching formalism while practicing pragmatism is “legitimate” is a question 
beyond the scope of this Essay.63 The point is only that, as a descriptive matter, this 
99IP THEORY Volume 1:  Issue 2
is something practiced by virtually every court and every judge in the United States.  
The common claim that the Federal Circuit is formalistic thus needs a great deal of 
TXDOLÀFDWLRQDWOHDVWLQWKHDUHDRISDWHQWVFRSH/LNHHYHU\RWKHUFRXUWWKH)HGHUDO
Circuit uses formalist rhetoric.  Moreover, like many other areas of law, the formalist 
rhetoric cloaks what in actuality is a great deal of pragmatic discretion.  Rumors of Federal 
Circuit exceptionalism in this regard, it would appear, have been greatly exaggerated.
